Do animals have rights

Do animals have rights? Should they have rights? Does animal suffering ‘count’ less than human suffering? Why or why not?

“In this short essay, I will argue that animals should have rights. Enlightening all the points how they suffers and how they are treated, I am strongly agree to the point . There’s a wide consensus that at least higher animals can consciously suffer, and even if we had doubts about this fact, it wouldn’t much affect our expected-value calculations. It’s sometimes claimed that humans suffer more intensely than animals because of deeper emotional experiences, but I think the inner pain itself represents a nontrivial fraction of the total badness of suffering , and even if we did count animals less, it again wouldn’t much affect calculations because of their extraordinary numbers relative to humans.
Animals suffering is a world issue from last 40 years. Its main sight is however on the walfare of the animals. negelecting the majority of animals: those living in the wild. On the empirical side, I argue that wild animals overwhelmingly outnumber animals, and that billions of animals are having more painful life and distressing than those of their captive counterparts. On the other part I must say as we have duties of assistance towards humans suffering from natural causes, and we reject anthropocentrism, we also have duties of assistance towards animals suffering in the wild.
If men have an wound or any injury or a fractured bone , terminal cancer they suffer .but how animals react? On any disease or fractures such as rabbit , bears, theoretically , it is acceptable that it is not the feeling at all as animals are not aware of this things. As philosophy for the animals species might make some sense where humans are taken to have originally different from animals, its matches totally with neither neuroscience nor evolution, Comparing our selves with birds rabbits and lions , moreover we can feel that we have the same feeling , same brain parts and the same pain feelings that they have. Sparrows rabbits and any animals have the same injuries to physical or mental health as we do. Despite the similarities We can say that humans work in fundamentally separate way than animals: animals non-consciously, humans consciously.
On the empirical side Even if people agree that animals can suffer, they may suggest that animals suffer less intensely because they don’t have the same high-level mental suffering that humans do. In response, I would first point out that it’s unclear whether the claim is true that animals have substantially less sophisticated mentation, at least “higher” animals like mammals. Animals show many of the behavior that humans do and are used as example of depression and stress when testing drugs. Elephants have death ritual. Crows appear to go sledding for fun. Marc Bekoff , Jonathan Balcombe, and other ethologists have written numerous books documenting the complex emotional lives of mammals, birds, fish, and even octopuses.

Also, what if we think they did suffer less? I guess I would ask, How much less do they suffer? Taking on a very serious note I must say it is more, and if not , then the basic calculations shows that, reports says that, animal welfare takes priority over human welfare would remain . there are so many examples that chicken is heated almost to boiling and starved alive in a boiling equipments. How much less bad would this experience be if you didn’t have broader thoughts about the end of your life, the injustice of your situation, how much you’ll miss your friends, etc.? I suspect that the raw physical pain would overwhelm these subsidiary thoughts during the moment, and even if not, I don’t think the higher-level thoughts would be vastly stronger than the raw pain.
Finally, there are several times once humans might in truth suffer less thanks to their understanding of matters. Humans finishing about of food poisoning can understand that the agony can end once daily or 2 which their friends and family can facilitate them within the time unit. Animals going through an equivalent experience might don’t have any plan what is happening to them, whether it can finish, or what will become of their lives.
While it may be an illusion, I subjectively feel as though my daily experiences are less emotional, and hence less morally important from a hedonistic perspective, now that I’m an adult compared with when I was a child, because as a child I had less ability to regulate my emotional state.
In humans, grief may be particularly potent because it becomes represented in a system which can plan ahead, and understand the enduring implications of the loss. (Thinking about or verbally discussing emotional states may also in these circumstances help, because this can lead towards the identification of new or alternative reinforcers, and of the realization that, for example, negative consequences may not be as bad as feared.)
The points discussed above are fascinating to ponder, and it’s valuable to hear from other people which of their own experiences they’ve found most unpleasant. That said, we modern humans live extremely comfortable lives compared with factory-farmed or wild animals, so it isn’t surprising that most of our worst memories may be of purely emotional injury. In any event, regardless of where we settle on the question of the relative magnitudes of animal and human pain, physical and psychological pain, I don’t think it’s likely to tip the balance of our calculations about where our dollars and hours will do the most good.
Importance of self-awareness?
LeDoux and Brown (2017) consider a representation of self as crucial for emotion:
Without the self there is no fear or love or joy. If some event is not affecting you, then it is not producing an emotion. When your friend or child suffers you feel it because they are part of you. When the suffering of people you don’t know affects you emotionally, it is because you empathize with them (put yourself in their place, feel their pain): no you, no emotion. The self is, as noted above, the glue that ties such multidimensional integrated representations together (156).
This idea that selfhood is important for emotion strikes me as odd. My imagination of a strong emotion like pain is that it’s mostly a message of “bad thing happening now!”, and situating that pain within the context of me as someone experiencing it is merely icing on the cake. What matters most about pain is the strong motivation it produces, and that motivation doesn’t seem to depend significantly on a concept of myself as the experiencer.
LeDoux and Brown (2017) add:
Tulving argued that autonoetic consciousness is an exclusive feature of the human brain (135). Other animals could, in principle, experience noetic states about being in danger. However, because such states lack the involvement of the self, as a result of the absence of autonoetic awareness, the states would not, in our view, be emotions.
Even if this hypothesis is true (for some sufficiently specific notion of “autonoetic consciousness”), it seems overly parochial to me to only count those kinds of minds as having emotions.